CFP: Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory
and Epistemology: a special issue of Topoi (Deadline: Oct. 31, 2017)
Call for Papers
Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory and Epistemology: a
special issue of Topoi
Submission Deadline: 31 October, 2017
Guest Edited by Patrick Bondy and David Godden
Topoi http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/11245 invites
submissions to Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory and
Epistemology, a special issue edited by Patrick Bondy (Brandon
University) and David Godden (Michigan State University).
The subject of this special issue is disagreement and how to rationally
respond to it. The issue itself aims to bring together multiple
perspectives bearing on the epistemological dimensions of disagreement
broadly conceived.
Robert Fogelin’s 1985 paper “The logic of deep disagreement” (Informal
Logic) contends that “deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the
use of argument, for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing.”
Chris Campolo (2007) characterizes this as the view that “there is a
kind of disagreement which will always turn our spade.” Similarly,
Michael Lynch (2010) has remarked that “Where there is deep epistemic
disagreement over some fundamental principle, the disagreement has hit
bedrock, the spade has turned.” The idea is that disagreements involving
conflicting “framework” or “hinge” propositions are not susceptible to
rational resolution, because framework propositions articulate paradigms
of judgement: as such they are epistemically primitive and fundamental,
and are entwined together with whole systems of beliefs, values, and
practices. Argumentation theorists since Fogelin have grappled with
problems such as whether rational resolutions are possible in cases of
deep disagreement, and how one rationally ought to proceed in cases of
apparently deep disagreements, and with what it means to say that a
disagreement is “deep.”
Other recent epistemological work on disagreement primarily concerns
what one ought to do in cases of “peer disagreement”—i.e., cases of
disagreement between rational agents judged to be roughly equally
reliable and informed on some topic. Epistemologists have wrestled with
what one ought rationally to do in such situations, as well as with what
it means to call someone an “epistemic peer,” and with whether a true
situation of peer disagreement could ever really arise in practice.
Yet, despite their common interests, and with a few notable exceptions
(e.g., Feldman (2005) and Siegel (2013)), work on disagreement in each
of these literatures—argumentation-theoretic and epistemological—has
occurred largely independently of work in the other. Our intention with
this issue is to push research on these topics forward by encouraging
authors to engage with the topic by drawing upon the scholarship and
theoretical resources provided by both perspectives.
References:
Campolo, C. (2007) Commentary on V. Memedi: “Resolving deep
disagreement.” In H.V. Hansen et al. (Eds.) Dissensus and the Search
for Common Ground. Windsor, ON: OSSA.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/
Feldman, R. (2005). Deep disagreement, rational resolutions, and
critical thinking. Informal Logic, 25, 13-23.
Fogelin, R.J. (1985). The logic of deep disagreements. Informal Logic 7,
1-8. [Reprinted in Informal Logic 25 (2005): 3-11.]
Lynch, M. (2010). Epistemic circularity and epistemic
incommensurability. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard (eds.),
Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford UP.
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0013
Siegel, H. (2013). Argumentation and the epistemology of deep
disagreement. Cogency, 5, 135-170.
Possible topics include (but are not limited to):
• Are there meaningful disagreements which, in principle, presuppose
conflicting framework propositions?
• How can recent work in epistemology and argumentation theory be
combined to answer practical, “real-world” problems surrounding (deep)
disagreement and its management or resolution?
• How one should rationally proceed in the face of “real-world”
disagreement, including apparently deep disagreements?
• Does a concession that some disagreements are deep involve a limit to
reason and reasoning itself and a concession to misology?
• What sorts of social factors contribute to the depth of disagreements?
Confirmed Invited Contributors: Andrew Aberdein (Florida Institute of
Technology); Scott Aikin (Vanderbilt University); J. Adam Carter
(University of Glasgow); Bryan Frances (Lingnan University) and Zoe
Cocchiaro (University of Hong Kong); Michael Hoffmann (Georgia Institute
of Technology); Catherine Hundleby (University of Windsor); Moira
Kloster (University of the Fraser Valley); Martin Kusch (University of
Vienna); Michael Lynch (University of Connecticut) and Paul Simard Smith
(University of Windsor); Jonathan Matheson (University of North
Florida); Duncan Pritchard (University of Edinburgh); Harvey Siegel
(University of Miami).
SUBMISSION PROCESS
Papers must be in English, should not exceed 8,000 words, and should
follow Topoi’s formatting guidelines which can be found at
http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/11245.
All manuscripts should be prepared for double-blind peer-review and be
submitted exclusively through the Online Manuscript Submission System
(Editorial Manager), accessible at http://www.editorialmanager.com/topo/
. When making a new submission, ensure you select the correct article
type – "S.I. : Disagreement: argumentation and epistemology
(Godden/Bondy)" – from the scroll-down menu for article type.
For further information please contact:
David Godden <[log in to unmask]> or Patrick Bondy <[log in to unmask]>
Submission deadline: October 31, 2017
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